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THE FUTURE OF TORT LITIGATION IN
CALIFORNIA
SANTA CLARA, CALIFORNIA, MARCH 11, 1989
II. BAD FAITH AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Transcript-Bad Faith and Punitive Damages
1. Introduction-Professor Eric Wright*
In this second panel of the conference on The Future of Tort
Litigation in California we will be focusing on the areas of bad
faith and punitive damages. We are privileged to have on the panel
three of the leading experts in California on these topics. In fact, our
three panelists literally wrote the book on bad faith practice in Cali-
fornia.1 Moreover, one of our panelists is now actually shaping Cali-
fornia law in the two areas of discussion as a member of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court.
If we had held this conference only a few years ago, our focus
would have been-as it will be today-on the California Supreme
Court. However, the questions that we would have been asking
would almost certainly have been very different from those to be ad-
dressed today.
Three years ago we would have been asking whether the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was going to expand tort law further, and
speculating on how far the court was likely to go in that expansion.
At that time most legal observers saw the California Supreme Court
as being at the forefront-some would say beyond the forefront-of
tort law across the country in virtually all areas. With respect to
such issues as products liability,2 landowner liability,' affirmative
* Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1967, Stanford
University; clerk for Judge M. Oliver Koelsch, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1967-1968;
Fulbright Scholar at the London School of Economics, 1968-1969; Reginald Heber Smith
Fellow, 1969-1971.
1. M. KAUFMAN, G. KORNBLUM, & H. LEVINE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: BAD
FAITH (1986).
2. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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duties to act,4 and emotional distress, 5 the California Supreme Court
had handed down landmark decisions expanding tort law.
In addition, the California Supreme Court took the lead in the
area of insurance settlements and claims practice. The court helped
to develop the concept of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which was found to be a part of every insurance contract. 6
As a consequence, a breach of the insurance contract might also in-
volve a violation of the implied covenant, and, therefore, a basis for a
tort cause of action. Such tort actions could (and often did) involve
recovery for emotional distress' as well as large punitive damage
awards.8 Moreover, in the Royal Globe case,9 the California Su-
preme Court found that actions could even be brought against a
third party's insurance carrier who failed to live up to the insurance
code requirements for settling claims.
Once the concept of good faith and fair dealing was found to be
a part of the insurance contract, it did not take long until attorneys
were asserting that such a covenant must also logically be a part of
other types of contracts. Following what appeared to be the obvious
lead of the California Supreme Court,'0 lower courts began ex-
tending the concept of good faith to other types of contracts," most
particularly, to employment contracts."
At the mythical conference three years ago, we would therefore
have been asking how far these concepts of good faith and fair deal-
ing would go, and whether there would be any logical stopping
place. It would not have been too difficult to anticipate the general
direction of the court in these areas. However, since the so-called
Rose Bird recall election of 1986 and the subsequent addition of
3. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
4. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976).
5. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
6. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967).
7. Id.
8. Annotation, Recoverability of Punitive Damages in Action by Insured Against Lia-
bility Insurer for Failure to Settle Claim Against Insured, 85 A.L.R. 3d 1211 (1978).
9. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1979).
10. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686
P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
11. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr.
551 (1985) (contract between bank and depositor).
12. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985);
Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Wallis v.
Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
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three new members to the California Supreme Court, predictions on
any of these issues are much more difficult and much more complex.
Quite often now the question is whether the court is going to limit,
perhaps cut back, or even overrule the past precedents that have ex-
panded tort law.
The role of stare decisis has become a central issue in Califor-
nia law. In fact, a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle described
an interchange on this very question between a "brilliant jurist" and
an attorney arguing before the "new" California Supreme Court in
April 1987. Let me quote briefly from that exchange. The brilliant
jurist asked, "Is it acceptable to overrule a decision if it is incorrectly
analyzed and incorrectly reasoned?" The attorney replied, "It would
be inappropriate to reverse a court precedent just because there has
been a change in the composition of the court." The brilliant jurist
said in response, "So how long must we enforce it if we conclude it
was incorrectly decided, incorrectly reasoned and incorrectly ana-
lyzed?" The attorney in response said, "I have the feeling that I'm
standing on quicksand."
A number of attorneys coming before this brilliant jurist have
felt at various times that they were standing on quicksand. We are
privileged to have him here today to answer the question that he
raised in that interchange, namely, under what circumstances is it
appropriate for a court to analyze past precedents, limit them, and
even overrule them. It is a great pleasure for me to introduce the
first panelist, Justice Marcus Kaufman of the California Supreme
Court-the brilliant jurist whom I quoted earlier.
2. The Panelists' Discussion*
a. Justice Marcus Kaufman**
Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be with you today.
The reason I was asked to discuss this particular topic is that I can't
talk about anything else. I was on the court of appeal for seventeen
and one-half years and nobody cared what I said. I could talk about
almost any topic since I wasn't going to be part of making the final
rule. I learned very quickly after being appointed to the supreme
court that being a member of that court made a difference. I went to
* We are indebted to Professor Eric Wright for moderating this discussion.
** Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of California; Justice of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal 1970-1987; L.L.B., 1956, University of Southern California; co-author of
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: BAD FAITH (TRG 1986).
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a dinner and I discovered I really couldn't say a thing. You become
quite limited in what you can discuss. I sat here today during the
conference discussion of Proposition 103,1" having heard the oral ar-
guments on that Proposition just the other day, and I obviously
didn't listen to anything that was said today on the issue. Being on
the supreme court does impose some limitations. I should also make
a disclaimer: any opinions I express are my own. They do not re-
present the views of the majority of the California Supreme Court
or, indeed, of any other justice. If you have been reading the advance
sheets you will see that recently I have been dissenting in almost
every major case.
The question whether to overrule an earlier decision is usually
a very difficult question. It almost always involves a conflict among
competing considerations of fundamental importance to the court and
to the administration of justice. When an established rule is chal-
lenged, the desirability of retaining the established rule, and thereby
maintaining consistency and stability, must be weighed against the
evil of perpetuating a bad rule of law. This dilemma often puts a
court in a no-win situation, particularly after a significant change in
its membership. If the court has concluded that the earlier decision
was wrong when it was decided, or that subsequent events have
demonstrated it is incorrect, unserviceable or mischievous, the court
has the option of perpetuating the erroneous or mischievous rule,
thus bringing discredit upon itself, or overruling the earlier decision
and inviting speculation by the media and some poorly informed
court commentators that the only reason for the new rule is that the
composition of the court has changed.
Our nation is governed by a unique and fundamental premise.
We often refer to it, somewhat cavalierly I think, as the rule of law.
What that means is that the government itself must obey the law.
That is really a concept that is unique to our people and to this
country. Of course, the government includes its judges. Thus the rule
of law means that the judges are expected to obey the law as well. A
tension is created by the fact that in our common law tradition the
law changes and develops. It is the judges who are duty bound not
only to obey the law but to make changes in the law, to the extent
that the changes are not within the legislative prerogative. The
courts are bound to see, and have a duty to see, that the law changes
as public mores and norms change.
13. This panel refers to the statute as Proposition 103, as it was called on the Novem-
ber, 1988 ballot.
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The foremost duty of courts in a free society is the principled,
and I emphasize principled, declaration of public norms. Any break-
down in principled decision-making, any rule for which no princi-
pled basis can be found and clearly articulated, subverts and discred-
its the institution as a whole. For the power base of the courts is
fragile. It consists of the public perception of the courts' role in the
structure of American government as the voice of reason, and the
public's faith that the laws judges make today, the judges themselves
will be bound by tomorrow. Any rule that permits or encourages
judgments based not on universal standards but individual expedi-
ency, or, worse yet, individual biases, erodes the public trust which
the courts serve and on which the courts must ultimately rely.
Stare decisis, therefore, should not be lightly dismissed in any
thoughtful reconsideration of the law. But history and experience re-
ally are the final judge of whether a decision was right or wrong,
and whether it should be retained or modified. Adherence to prece-
dent cannot justify the perpetuation of a policy ill-conceived in the-
ory or unfair in practice. As Justice Harlan aptly observed, a judi-
cious reconsideration of precedent cannot be so threatening to the
public faith as the judiciary's continued adherence to a rule unjusti-
fied in reason which produces different results for breaches of duty
in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.
I hope that will demonstrate to you that the courts have a duty
to change the law. They also have a duty to obey the law, and it is
the tension between those two. duties that is involved in the question
whether to overrule an earlier decision or earlier rule of law. The
courts have developed some criteria that are of some help in their
determinations whether to overrule or not. The following are some
criteria which would point toward not overruling a decision. (By the
way, there is a whole set of these and many pages of discussion in
Volume Nine of Witkin's California Procedure,14 and I should give
credit to Witkin by acknowledging that this is where I have found
some of these).
One is that the earlier rule -has been long accepted and relied
on. A special category within that heading is that the rule has been
relied on to create vested property or contract rights. That would
lead to a greater reluctance to overrule. Another criteria is the fail-
ure of the legislature to act following the earlier decision. That is
most applicable to earlier decisions which interpreted a statute, a
14. 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeals §§ 787-92 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp.
1988).
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legislative enactment, or an initiative. That would indicate or point
to a reluctance to overrule. Then there are some miscellaneous con-
siderations. One is whether the earlier case was well-presented; in
other words, fully argued, fully briefed, thoroughly considered, and
well supported by legal doctrine or theory. It also seems to make
some difference how developed was the court. I think an earlier deci-
sion that was decided four to three on a seven person court is more
vulnerable to overruling.
What are some of the criteria that point to overruling an earlier
decision? One is that the earlier decision was wrong when it was
decided, that it was improperly analyzed or based on an incorrect
legal theory, that it failed to follow a controlling precedent or statute,
or was contrary to sound public policy. The second would be that
the earlier decision states a legal principle or rule that may have
been correct at the time it was decided, but subsequently became or
has been shown to be incorrect or improvident. That can arise, for
example, from a statutory change in the law, a change in controlling
United States Supreme Court decisions, the fact that the earlier deci-
sion is now inconsistent with the court's recent rulings, or that it has
proved impractical in application. It could be that the earlier deci-
sion was based on public policy grounds, and now the public policy
has changed dramatically. Probably the last one I should mention is
that the earlier decision is now contrary to the great weight of au-
thority in the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions which
have considered the same question. That is just one way of saying
that the decision is out of step with change, public mores and
practices.
The recent Moradi-Shalalt decision of the California Supreme
Court, overruling the court's earlier decision in Royal Globe," is a
classic case both of and for overruling. Before I proceed, I suppose I
had better give some background on these cases. In Royal Globe the
supreme court interpreted subdivision (h) of California Insurance
Code section 790.03, a provision of the Unfair Practices Act,'7 which
prohibits insurers from engaging in certain unfair claims settlement
practices. The court held that an individual who is injured by the
alleged negligence of an insured may sue the negligent party's in-
surer for violation of California Insurance Code section 790.03(h).
15. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 116 (1988).
16. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1979).
17. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
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The reason I say Moradi-Shalal is a classic case is that the rule of
Royal Globe was of some vintage. It had been decided nine to ten
years before Moradi-Shalal was decided. Since its inception Royal
Globe had been relied on by litigants and their attorneys. In addi-
tion, the legislature had failed to decisively act in response to Royal
Globe and the court's interpretation that a private right of action was
established.
Several bills were introduced to countermand the Royal Globe
decision, but none were passed. On the other hand, no other legisla-
tion was passed indicating clearly one way or another that the legis-
lature really approved of the decision. I will mention this just briefly
as my last point. Justice Kaus spoke earlier about the myth of legis-
lative intent or the will of the voters. We always say we look for
legislative intent, but one must wonder whether in fact it exists at
all, and in many cases we are absolutely sure it does not. If the
legislature had thought of the problem, they would have done some-
thing about it, the legislature did not think about it. We will come
back to that.
There were factors which would have pointed to not overruling
Royal Globe. On the other hand, the decision in Royal Globe was by
a deeply divided court with a four to three vote. Royal Globe was
clearly incorrect when decided. The Unfair Practices Act 8 was very
clearly a piece of regulatory legislation. Many states had essentially
the same legislation because the Unfair Practices Act was based on a
model act,19 and California used virtually the same .language as was
adopted in numerous states throughout the country. Practically every
state supreme court that considered the matter said "No, this was
not intended to create a private right of action." Thus the California
decision in Royal Globe turned out to be contrary to the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority. I recognize, of course, that Royal Globe was
among the first of the decisions. It was not known what the reaction
of other jurisdictions would be at the time Royal Globe was decided.
In addition, Royal Globe had caused great mischief. It created a
serious conflict of interest between the insurer and its insured. It also
permitted the injured third party to take advantage of that conflict in
sometimes very unfair ways. In addition, it spawned an absolute del-
uge of litigation. The trial courts and courts of appeal were over-
18. Id.
19. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, An Act Relating to Un-
fair Methods of Competition and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance, 2
NAIC Proceedings 392 (1947). See generally Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at
63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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whelmed with these cases. This at a time when they and the Califor-
nia Supreme Court were already overloaded.
On balancing these factors, the majority of the court decided
Royal Globe should be overruled. I have said that it was clear the
Insurance Code sections20 were not intended to create this right. Ob-
viously, I am stating this from the viewpoint of hindsight, because
the court in Royal Globe decided that question the opposite way, and
the dissenting justices in Moradi-Shala21 still felt that a private
right of action was established. We have to give recognition to that.
However, the Moradi-Shalal majority thought Royal Globe had
done more harm than good, and that it should be overruled on the
basis of these factors that I have discussed with you.
I do want to say before sitting down a special word about the
inference to be drawn from legislative inaction following a decision
of a court. Let me read from just a very brief portion of WITKIN on
the topic of appeals.22 It says:
Despite the formidable list of declarations to this effect, [that
legislative inaction means that the legislature has either adopted
or approved the court's earlier decision] the theory that failure
of the legislature to act safeguards an erroneous rule of law
seems the least impressive of the reasons for following prece-
dent. The notion of an alert and omnipresent legislative watch-
dog is pure fantasy. 'It is unrealistic to suppose that [the legisla-
ture] can take note, much less deliberate the effect, of each
judicial construction of statutory provisions, absorbed as it is
with forging legislation for an endless number and variety of
problems, under the constant pressure of considerations of ur-
gency and expediency. The fiction that the failure of the legisla-
ture to repudiate an erroneous construction amounts to an in-
corporation of that construction into the statute not only
commits the legislature to embrace something it may not even be
aware of, but bars the court from re-examining its own errors,
consequences as unnecessary as they are serious.' 3
Certainly you will continue to see the failure to act rule just
referred to. There are certain occasions where history would indicate
that the legislature's failure to act may indeed be an adoption. For
example, in some other area the Legislature may have enacted a
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 313, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
22. 9 B. WITKIN, supra note 14, § 791.
23. Id. (quoting In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 132, 130 P.2d 384, 387 (1942) (Tray-
nor, J., dissenting)).
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statute that refers to the rule that the court has announced. In any
event, you will still encounter the rule, but bear in mind that it re-
ally is a fiction. It may be more or less applicable in individual cir-
cumstances, but it is a fiction, and, according to Witkin, has never
fared well as an argument for not overruling decisions.
b. Guy 0. Kornblum*
As a practicing lawyer, I am charged with the responsibility of
advising and counseling my clients on what such cases as Moradi-
Shalal"4 and Foley2" mean. In doing so, it is also my responsibility to
advise them on the prospects for future changes in the law. Not only
must I consider tort reform in general and what the rules ought to
be, but how change might occur. In that vein, we are really con-
cerned with three things.
First, who should initiate, or be responsible for, reform in the
law? The courts have traditionally taken an active role in California,
but are questioning whether they should continue to do so. Justice
Kaufman's decision in the Foley26 case is instructive on this issue.
The legislature, a traditional forum for reform, has been inactive in
initiating the process of reviewing and revising laws in accordance
with the will of the people as reflected in the polls. There is also the
initiative process, which to some represents a hysterical and expen-
sive appeal to the electorate, rather than the staid, traditional, inves-
tigative process. One issue to consider is whether it is really effective
and efficient to permit the trend towards reliance on the initiative
process to continue, and whether it can be quelled by a more active
judiciary or more active legislature.
The second issue that I think we are faced with is how fast tort
reform should occur. It is one thing to say that we should initiate the
process of revising the rules. It is another thing to say how and when
that should be done. Moradi-Shalal and Royal Globe27 represent ten
years of judicial and legislative history which virtually turned our
courtrooms upside down. Royal Globe created the "Settle and Sue
* Partner, Kornblum & McBride, San Fransisco, CA; J.D., 1966, Hastings College of
the Law; Director for the Hastings Center for Trial and Appellate Advocacy; co-author of
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: BAD FAITH (1986).
24. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116.
25. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988).
26. Id. at 715, 765 P.2d at 412, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
27. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 892 (1979).
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Syndrome," which motivated the California Supreme Court to reach
the decision it did in Moradi-Shalal.
Foley represents tension in this area as well. New rules of dam-
ages, or revised rules of damages, are now applicable to certain types
of contract claims that mature into more expansive, potential tort
claims. There is now a restriction on the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing as it establishes the rules of damages which apply. That
is a dramatic change to some, an anticipated change for others and a
well-received change for many, particularly the employers.
The major question now is: Should we have the evolution occur
so rapidly, or is it better to let that evolution occur through the fabric
of the common law over a long process? We should also consider to
what extent the courts are to be involved in the editing process by
having a "statute" that is drafted and put before the electorate,
passed and then reviewed and revised by the judiciary. Should that
occur in the dialogue concerning Proposition 103?8 Who should in-
stitute or be responsible for reform in the law? How fast should it
occur? Those are the first two issues.
The third issue along this line is: Should these dramatic changes
apply to past events? For example, the Newman29 case was argued
recently before the California Supreme Court on the single issue of
whether Foley is retroactive." ° Given these three issues, it is impor-
tant for those of us who practice law to evaluate these rules and how
we will apply them. All that has been discussed today fits into one of
those three categories. We also are charged with the responsibility of
anticipating the changes. In order to do that it is necessary to under-
stand what rules have emerged from Moradi-Shalal and Foley.
In that process we have to look at Foley and Moradi-Shalal
and ask, "What about the future?" What do these cases say about
the health and vigor of Seamen's?81 How do they affect lender liabil-
ity cases? Will they continue to provide tort remedies to those who
are injured?
I see the arguments on both sides very well posited in Foley.
What I do not see at the present time in the California Supreme
28. See supra note 13.
29. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 772 P.2d 1059, 258 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1988).
30. Subsequent to this panel discussion, the California Supreme Court rendered its
opinion in Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 973, 772 P.2d at 1059, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 592, that Foley,
47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, was fully retroactive.
31. Seamen's Direct Buying Serv., Inc., v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686
P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
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Court is a commitment to a particular view. Rather, I see the ten-
sions building. Five to two in Moradi-Shalal and four to three in
Foley tells me that we still do not have a commitment on the part of
the court to a particular line that we can anticipate in the future.
Justice Kaufman made a strong emotional appeal in his dissent in
Foley2 for allegiance to what I perceive to be a more expansionist
approach to tort law, perhaps in the vein of the late Chief Justice
Traynor or the late Justice Tobriner.
Important new rules of law have been decided in Moradi-
Shalal and Foley. From Moradi-Shalal, we know that Royal Globe
is reversed, dead, and buried. The rule in Royal Globe that third
party liability claimants can bring a direct action against an insurer
no longer exists. Such claims may possibly be resurrected by the leg-
islature, or (doubtfully) resurrected by Proposition 103." 8 Nonethe-
less, for the time being, section 790 claims 4 are no longer.
We also know from Moradi-Shalal that the bar against third
party claims is prospective only, in that such claims are preserved as
to those cases that were filed before October 18, 1988, when Moradi-
Shalal was decided. As to Royal Globe cases that existed before that
date, there must be a final judicial determination of the insured's
liability. What exactly is a "final judicial determination"? That is
for the courts to determine. From Moradi-Shalal we know that a
settlement is not sufficient. Even a stipulated judgment may not be
enough, although I see that the Liu" case was ordered not published
recently. There is still a question of whether a summary judgment of
liability followed by a trial on damages is a sufficient judicial deter-
mination. A recent unpublished opinion from the Fourth Appellate
District indicates that this is not sufficient to qualify for a pre-
Moradi-Shalal section 790.0336 suit. Farah,"7 a Second District
opinion, deals with a question of whether a bifurcated trial with a
plaintiff's verdict followed by a settlement is sufficient to qualify.
Farah88 indicates such a settlement is sufficiently final. So there ap-
pears to be an inconsistency between the Second and Fourth Dis-
tricts. It is also not clear whether verdicts with judgments, appeals
32. Id. at 715, 765 P.2d at 413, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
33. See supra, note 13.
34. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
35. Liu v. Interinsurance Exch., 205 Cal. App. 3d 968, 252 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1988)
(Reporter of Decisions directed not to publish this opinion, Mar. 2, 1989).
36. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
37. Farah v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. App. 3d 964, 255 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1989).
38. Id. at 980, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
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and then settlements afterward qualify. There are many issues at-
tendant to defining "final judicial determination."
The fourth thing Moradi-Shalal tells us is that traditional tort
remedies are preserved. A third party may still bring a direct cause
of action against the insurance company for fraud, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and invasion of privacy. Defendants may also be joined through con-
spiracy allegations. The future of these four rules from Moradi-
Shalal will depend upon how the courts interpret the supreme court
opinion and how the legislature acts.
Foley" also presents interesting developments in tort law.
While Moradi-Shalal eliminates a cause of action, Foley simply re-
stricts the damages that can be recovered in cases involving wrongful
termination. Moreover, Foley indicates that the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is alive and well in employment contracts. The
question becomes whether a breach of that covenant or promise leads
to tort damages, and especially punitive damages. If there is a tort
cause of action, then punitives may attach. If a plaintiff is limited to
contract remedies, then a limitation is placed on compensatory dam-
ages, and a limit may also be placed on what punitive damages can
be recovered.
Foley holds that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing does not give rise to tort damages in the employment situa-
tion, even though it may be somewhat convincingly argued that the
employment relationship is similar to the insurance relationship, and
that the same rules ought to apply. Justice Kaufman's dissent in Fo-
ley40 reflects that analysis. His opinion in Koehrer41 outlines the
rules that he believes should apply in this situation.
The third rule from Foley is that tort actions for violations of
public policy (all of the Tameny4' cases) are not affected by Foley.
There is still such a thing as a wrongful discharge tort claim, but it
is predicated strictly on the rules that were announced in Tameny.
The last rule from Foley is that a cause of action for an implied
in fact promise not to terminate without just cause, similar to the
39. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988).
40. Id. at 715, 765 P.2d at 412, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
41. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986).
42. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980) (when employer's discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of pub-
lic policy, the discharged employee may bring a tort action and recover traditional tort
damages).
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Pugh4" case, is not affected by Foley because it sounds in contract,
not tort. So despite the fact that California law dictates that if there
is no provision in the contract for a period of employment the em-
ployment is at will, this interpretation of the contract may be modi-
fied by oral evidence at trial. The contract may be interpreted as
providing for permanent employment, but if breached it may only
entitle the plaintiff to contract remedies. There is still exposure to
punitive damages in the employment area but only if the plaintiff
proves a tort claim. There are limitations on the recovery of punitive
damages in wrongful discharge cases. The question now is to what
extent the courts are going to be involved in determining how exten-
sively punitive damages remedies may be applied. The Legislature's
reform measure, Civil Code section 3294"4 now requires that there
be "clear and convincing"4 evidence in punitive damage cases.
Mandatory bifurcated trials are available if requested by the defend-
ant or ordered by the court. "Despicable" '46 is now an element to be
proved before punitive damages may be awarded.
The problem, as I see it, is that punitives have become too com-
monplace. They are sought in virtually every type of tort action.
There is an element of irrationality in punitive damage awards that
has offended many, including judges and lawyers. What is needed is
controls. The judge in my view has the duty to screen cases involving
punitive damages. The judge must determine whether there is
enough to present the case to the jury. The jury must be given stan-
dards beyond just the slippery notion of "conscious disregard." In
my view, that is what the U.S. Supreme Court will consider when
deciding Kelco.4' The question may be whether the recent reforms in
California by amendments to Civil Code sections 329448 and 32954'
meet any minimum institutional standards which are adopted.
Throughout my twenty-three years at the bar and almost
twenty years in handling cases that involve punitive damage con-
cepts, punitive damages have evolved as a weapon of the David ver-
sus Goliath war. They are simply a means of punishing only corpo-
rate America. They are not applied to all. They are a form of
43. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
44. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & Supp. 1989).
45. Id. § 3294(a).
46. Id. §§ 3294(c)(1), 3294(c)(2).
47. Kelco Disposal v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1988), appeal
pending.
48. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989).
49. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1989).
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selective punishment. They are contrary to the basic fundamental
notions of equal justice under the law. It is not fair to have rules that
say it is okay to do it to Donald Trump, but not to everyone else.
c. Harvey Levine*
I was looking at the audience when I came in here today and
saw many law students, some judges who have been on the bench for
a long time, and some incredibly fine trial lawyers who have worked
hard, including probably two or three of the most brilliant appellate
attorneys in the country. And it -is quite interesting to me to hear
everyone take a position.
I have always loved tort law and there are some real reasons for
it. I listened carefully to Justice Kaufmann discussing the factors
that go into the writing of an opinion. Similarly, when you choose
your profession, you hope to choose it for a select group of reasons
and based on a number of factors. I started practicing punitive dam-
age law and began preparing my first case when I was about fifteen
years old while living in the slums of Brooklyn and watching most of
my friends go to jail or prison at a young age for a moment's
indiscretion.
One night I was reading a book and I came to a quote in the
book that established probably the beginnings of preparing my first
punitive damage case. This excerpt of the book said, "The greatest
evil is not now done in those dens of crime that Dickens used to
paint, it's not even done in concentration camps or labor camps be-
cause there you see the final result. But is conceived and ordered,
moved, seconded, and carried, in clean, carpeted, warmed, and well
lighted offices by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails
and smooth shaven cheeks who do not need to raise.their voice."
Hence, naturally enough, my symbol for hell is something like the
bureaucracy of a police state, or the offices of a thoroughly nasty
business concern.
No matter what you hear or read in relation to tort law, large
damage awards, and bad faith or punitive damages, it is undisputed
that tort law has served as one of the most significant deterrents in
this country to injury and death. I wrote an article in 1979 entitled,
"Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent Effect of Punitive
* Partner, Levine, Steinberg & DePasquale, San Diego, CA; President, California Trial
Lawyers Association; J.D., L.L.M., and J.S.D., New York University School of Law;
Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; co-author of CALIFORNIA
PRACTICE GUIDE: BAD FAITH (1986).
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Damages.""0 All of the articles that I cite there demonstrate the de-
terrent effect of punitive damage law ten years ago. These refer-
ences, for the most part, are to Guy Kornblum's articles, which have
served the advantage of many insurance companies and thereby the
public who benefit from increased fair claims practices.
By writing those articles and giving those lectures, Guy has
been able to improve the claims practices of companies throughout
the country. He's done much to prevent unfair claims practices, at
least as much as plaintiff lawyers have. Maybe the spark was the
large punitive damage verdict against Mutual of Omaha or maybe it
was the fear of punitive damage awards. Nonetheless, I know Guy
believes in the deterrent effect of punitive damages, and I know he
would not want to see punitive damages abolished as much as I
don't.
Everyone is here today with their bias, and I would like to
share a thought with you: every one of you has public trust. The
diversity of the group attending today's conference is astounding.
You have got the farthest of the far right joining us today with the
leftist of the left. But unless there comes a time within the immediate
future when we reacquire respect for our government, and we re-
mind ourselves of those basic terms, separation of powers and the
governmental institutions that we all ascribe to as a profession, the
future of bad faith and punitive damages will be just a small drop in
the bucket compared with the continued decay and deterioration of
our beautiful legal system. I conducted a lengthy trial shortly after
the initiatives. I have had jury selection, have read numerous focus
group transcripts, and have read numerous pollings incident to those
initiatives. None of these talk about plaintiff lawyers, defense law-
yers, or lawyers at all. They talk about the courts and the legal sys-
tem. The public doesn't know what lawyers do. Nonetheless, lawyers
are seen as part of a legal system that is unfair.
I would like to share with you some reasons why the public
view of lawyers is negative. I believe it has infected the thought
processes of our courts and just about every element of our society.
For example, I will read excerpts from an article entitled "Joke
Writers, Among Others, Go Wild at Attorneys' Expense: Lawyer
Laughs." "What's black and-brown and looks good on a lawyer? A
doberman." "What do you call 12,000 lawyers at the bottom of the
Pacific Ocean? A good start." "Why do scientists use lawyers instead
50. Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages,
U.S.F. L. REV. 613 (1979).
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of laboratory rats? Because there are some things rats won't do."
"What's the difference between a lawyer's body and a skunk's body
laying in the road? There are skid marks in front of the skunk." I
laughed when I read these, but you shouldn't laugh at these jokes
because when you walk into a courtroom you are a lawyer.
Every insured in this state received a letter along with their
premium increase, giving the carrier's objective appraisal as to why
their premium is being increased. One of them from a company
called, ironically enough, Safeco:
This new policy is a response to our rapidly changing legal cli-
mate. There is a tendency by the courts to distort the home
owners policy. The reason your policy is increasing is because
of the courts. (Emphasis added).
You want to pick some jurists and speak to them about it? I have
done it. Jurists don't look at the judges much more favorably than
they look at you.
Plaintiffs lawyers and law professors' hypotheticals could not
get close to the facts of Tibbs v. Great American Ins. Co. 51 The
Great American Insurance Company was told by the trial judge to
defend the famous rodeo star Casey Tibbs because he was not an
independent employee but rather an independent contractor and
therefore he was an employee of the insured. When the lawyer told
the company what the trial judge held, the company refused to de-
fend. In the federal trial which proceeded afterwards on the refusal
to defend, it was undisputed that the claims manager of the eastern
company said ". . . no court of law is going to tell us what to do."5
Isolated instances, but I have worked with companies and eval-
uated bad faith cases for fourteen years, and there are some cases in
my office with companies that have never come across the desk of
any attorney. They are fine companies. What have they done with
some of the money they made from premiums? I have listened this
morning to Frank Rothman5" who is probably, in my opinion, one of
the most respected attorneys in this country, and I have heard how
important the constitution is and how important it is to abide by the
constitution.
Let me read you the full-page ad paid for by our insurance
51. Tibbs v Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985).
52. Id. at 1376.
53. Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Los Angeles, CA; Chairman of
the Board and C.E.O. of MGM/UA Communications; L.L.B., University of Southern Cali-
fornia; lead counsel for the plaintiffs in Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 258
P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989).
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premiums, regarding the case of California Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion v. Eu, 4 in which our First District Court of Appeals held that
the first no-fault initiative violated the single subject rule of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. A campaign contribution law had slipped into
the middle of the pages of the no-fault law and the court saw that it
really did not have anything to do with the no-fault law. The single
subject rule is a very vital part of our California Constitution, espe-
cially in regard to initiatives-no "bait and switch."
The court decided the case, and the insurance industry, in a full
page article utilizing the Superintendent of Public Education, stated
"paid for by your premium dollars": "Having the public respect for
the constitution of this state, the lawyers responded to no-fault re-
forms by filing a lawsuit against the no-fault initiative asking an
appeals court to strike no-fault from the ballot on grounds of a 'legal
technicality' called the single subject rule, which says an initiative
can only address one issue."
Since when is the California Constitution a legal technicality?
When in the history of this state or this country have you seen insur-
ance companies putting full page ads in the paper, dealing with the
same object that the initiative is suppose to direct itself toward. And
if that's not bad enough, there is a continued attack upon the courts.
How would you feel if you were an appellate justice in.this state?
You can't even respond to this. I say, "To 'the amazement of respon-
sible leaders, the judges agreed with their fellow lawyers, and ruled
against the 650 thousand Californians who signed the initiative for
no-fault auto insurance..
I am the president of California Trial Lawyers Association, and
after Moradi-Shalal,55 there wasn't one member of CTLA who
liked that opinion. If any lawyer ever came up to me and said "Let's
take out a full page article in a Sacramento Bee, and take a hit upon
that supreme court for what we might consider some ostracism of
consumer rights," I would move to have that lawyer removed from
our Association. Here is an industry taking premium dollars. Forget
about plaintiff lawyers, forget about the tort system, the attack is
upon the system, upon the constitution and upon our courts.
The future of bad faith law and the future of punitive damages
will be like the future of much of our law in this state and probably
in the country. There have been a lot of dissatisfied people in busi-
54. 200 Cal. App. 3d 351, 245 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1988).
55. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 116 (1988).
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nesses. I suggest that what you need to do as a leader is to not have
forums like this in which the debate goes on, spending 100 million
dollars to fuel the debate through high tech media polling focus
groups and confusing people. All we do is partake in a system which
is supposed to benefit the public. The system whereby the court
serves the public, the lawyers serve the public, and the insurance
companies and legislators are supposed to serve the public, has been
a total failure in the last few years. The initiative process is a by-
product of public dismay with leadership. Californians are turning
their lonely eyes, their empty pockets, and their confused minds to
the initiative process.
I could not agree more with Justice Kaus56 that the initiative
process needs some examining, and as lawyers we could pick apart
words in an initiative. That is how we argue our cases. I have tried
enough punitive cases to tell you that the standard is incredibly high.
It has got to be clear and convincing. The move in Parker" was
towards beyond a reasonable doubt. When the standard is beyond a
reasonable doubt, and fines are restricted (making it profitable to
engage in the same act they are supposed to deter), what I would
like to see is a corporate decency act to fight the crime in the suites,
not only the streets.
People say that plaintiff lawyers like punitive damages because
of the money. Nonetheless, I make a proposal, in terms of my public
contribution to this state, to work pro bono for two years in order to
try the first corporate executives who engage in the kind of fraud
that usually results in punitive damages. In this way, corporations
don't slough it off to their customers or pass it on to policy holders.
Instead, there is individual accountability for wrongful acts resulting
in possible prison terms. In this way, corporate misconduct is de-
terred in the same way we deter others.
The future of punitive damages, the future of bad faith, and the
future of our legal system will depend on what you do after hearing
all these varied viewpoints today. I have been involved in this for
many years now and I always get confused and angry. Emotionally,
I feel as if I want to do something. Hence, in the last four or five
months, as president of California Trial Lawyers, I have tried to do
a few things. I have written a lot of pieces, spoken to members of the
56. Partner, Hufstedler, Miller, Kaus & Beardsley, Los Angeles, CA; Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of California 1981-1985; Justice of the Second District Court of Appeal
1964-1981; Judge of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County 1961-1964; L.L.B., 1949,
Loyola Marymount University, School of Law.
57. People v. Parker, 159 Cal. 3d 903, 205 Cal. Rptr. 767.
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legislature, and I am trying to reach out to insurance companies and
manufacturers to suggest that we have established processes. Plaintiff
lawyers, defense lawyers, insurance company lawyers, and insurance
companies have been beating up judges, and our court system is not
going to solve the problem. I believe the problem will get worse
before it gets better.
I have taken effort to invite legislators, insurance companies,
plaintiff lawyers, defense lawyers, and most importantly consumer
groups, to join together in the one thing that they all believe in as
human beings and in which they all have a common interest in terms
of their own economic needs-prevention. Insurance companies
profit from preventing injury with good underwriting, and then the
public benefits from that as well. The legislature is supposed to pre-
vent injury and death, as are lawyers and consumer groups. We
should get off the bandwagon about whether the tort system is good
or not, and get down to preventing harm. Even if you wanted to look
at it from a purely economic standpoint, you can really prevent a lot
of injury and death by having tort laws that hold asbestos tortfeasors
accountable for their conduct. You can prevent a lot of economic
harm and tragedy by having products liability laws that discourage
manufacturers from marketing and selling products they know cause
serious injury or death.
If someone said to you "Give me your constitutional rights and
your fourth amendment rights because they aren't working correctly.
Let's take your rights away, and not try to fix the problem." You
would probably respond "My God!" In modern America, the law of
punitive damages and products liability is as important to you as any
of your constitutional rights. Yet, no one believes that they will ever
have to use these rights. Nonetheless, many sitting in this room
might be here because of the tort law that currently exists.
I have had people who have been sued for punitive damages,
some of them large corporations, and I have represented people who,
while being sued for punitive damages, have sought punitive dam-
ages themselves. I have represented people who were worth ten times
as much as the insurance company they sue, and they believe in pu-
nitive damages. You can find cases in which corporations bring suit
against insurance companies, and I have represented insurance com-
panies against insurance companies. The doctrine is available when
you need it. However, some effort to preserve it must be made be-
cause your pride, your profession, and this legal system, is at great
risk.
Today, the pride you feel as an attorney or justice is very con-
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trary to the way people look at you and what you are doing. The
future of punitive damages and bad faith law will depend on how
you respond to those challenges and the forces that present and por-
tray you the way the public sees you.
d. Summation-Justice Marcus Kaufman
As usual, Harvey, Guy and I have worked on a number of pro-
grams together. I find it very difficult to sum up what they said,
therefore I am not going to make that attempt. I just have a couple
of observations.
I am sure you all know that Harvey has had a couple of zillion
dollar verdicts against the insurance companies in the bad faith area,
and it was interesting for me to hear him say he has been reaching
out to insurance companies. Now I know where the telephone com-
pany got that slogan, "Reach out and touch someone." The only
other things I would say, though I can't comment too much on what
the result of these efforts will be, is that I have two thoughts about
where we are going to see some expanded litigation as a result of
Foley" and perhaps also Moradi-Shalal" to some extent.
One is that I think you are going to see an effort made on be-
half of claimants in wrongful discharge cases to recover emotional
distress damages under the contract theory. There are some cases in
various fields allowing emotional distress damages in some contract
cases. For example, Justice Broussard's dissent in the Foley0 case
discusses these damages. As I say, I can't tell you what success they
will have, but I see that as a fairly obvious move.
I also think there is an interesting question with respect to the
issue of ERISA 1 preemption and the Foley decision. I am not sure
what the Foley decision really said about the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The one thing I do know is that after Foley one
could argue that bad faith only pertains to insurance companies. It is
no longer a part of the general tort law of the State of California.
Now I am not saying that as a fact, but I say it could be argued. In
which case, what effect does that have upon the ERISA preemption?
58. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988).
59. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 116 (1988).
60. 47 Cal. 3d at 701, 765 P.2d at 402, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
61. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 29
1989] BAD FAITH 565
Well, if it pertains only to insurance companies, maybe it is a regu-
lation of insurance companies and therefore would be exempt from
the ERISA preemption. I could not possible predict the result of any
such argument, but it seems to me that the Foley decision has lots
more in it, and may have lots more ramifications, than initially meets
the eye.
My final comment is I think you are to be congratulated for
taking your time on a Saturday, and having the interest in the law
and the problems that we all face in our society, to come here and
discuss these things and educate yourself to some extent about them.
I think you are to be highly commended and I hope to see you at
another such event someday in the future. Thank you very much.

